Academic Writing
forthcoming. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
Synopsis: Pain systems don't infer, they transduce.
A foundational assumption of contemporary cognitive science is that perceptual processing involves inferential transitions between representational states. However, it remains controversial whether accounts of this kind extend to modalities whose perceptual status is a matter of debate. In particular, it remains controversial whether we should attribute inferential mechanisms to the sensory processing underpinning (human) pain experiences. This paper argues that, contrary to recent proposals in the philosophy and science of pain, pain processing is not mediated by inferential transitions. To this end, I show that standard motivations for inferentialism—including appeal to underdetermination, illusion, cue combination, cognitive penetration, perceptual constancy, and invariance—do not carry over to pain. Instead, I suggest that pain’s sensory processing may be better characterised as an idiosyncratic form of transduction, distinguishing it both from paradigmatic perceptual modalities and canonical transducers.
[2] Is Pain Modular? (with Sam Clarke)
2023. Mind & Language 38(3): 828-846.
Synopsis: If pain systems did infer, your hopes and dreams wouldn't be part of the mix.
We suggest that pain processing has a modular architecture. We begin by motivating the (widely assumed but seldom defended) conjecture that pain processing comprises inferential mechanisms. We then note that pain exhibits a characteristic form of judgement independence. On the assumption that pain processing is inferential, we argue that its judgement independence is indicative of modular (encapsulated) mechanisms. Indeed, we go further, suggesting that it renders the modularity of pain mechanisms a default hypothesis to be embraced pending convincing counterevidence. Finally, we consider what a modular pain architecture might look like, and question alleged counterevidence to our proposal.
[3] A Hole in the Box and a Pain in the Mouth (with Henry Schiller)
2021. The Philosophical Quarterly 71(4): 685-700.
Synopsis: If there's a pain in your finger, and your finger is in your mouth, then there's a pain in your mouth. Duh!
The following argument is widely assumed to be invalid: there is a pain in my finger; my finger is in my mouth; therefore, there is a pain in my mouth. The apparent invalidity of this argument has recently been used to motivate the conclusion that pains are not spatial entities. We argue that this is a mistake. We do so by drawing attention to the metaphysics of pains and holes and provide a framework for their location which both vindicates the argument's validity and explains why it appears invalid. To this end, we show that previously proposed explanations for the apparent invalidity of the argument fail. Moreover, we show that our account accommodates and explains seemingly opposing linguistic data. We conclude that the ‘pain-in-mouth argument’ does not undermine the view that pains are spatial entities.
2021. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 99(2): 364-378.
Synopsis: Pain doesn't care all that much about your injuries.
Various prominent theories of pain assume that it is pain’s biological function to inform organisms about damage to their bodies. I argue that this is a mistake. First, there is no biological evidence to support the notion that pain was originally selected for its informative capacities, nor that it currently contributes to the fitness of organisms in this specific capacity. Second, neurological evidence indicates that modulating mechanisms in the nociceptive system systematically prevent pain from serving a primarily informative role. These considerations threaten to undermine standard perceptual and representational accounts of pain.
Public Writing
[5] Objective pain score? Here's the problem with that
forthcoming. The Conversation (Health Section)
Synopsis: The problem with pain measurement is not technological, but philosophical. Biomarkers won't fix it.
Work in Progress
These projects are in various states of completion, but I'd be happy to discuss any of them with you. Drafts are available on request.
[6] A paper arguing against alleged evidence for sociobiological differences in pain sensitivity
Synopsis: Let's not pretend anyone knows how to measure this stuff.
[7] A paper exploring the idea that pain experiences are incommunicable
Synopsis: What's a "musk deer headache" again?
[8] A paper about the role of putative "pain illusions" in the history of pain science
Synopsis: The science of perception is shaped by the study of illusions. If there are pain illusions, why aren't they shaping the science of pain?
[9] A paper about the thermal grill illusion
Synopsis: No one thought this hurt until the late 20th century. Why do people think it hurts now?
[10] A paper about the possibility of a genuine science of pain
Synopsis: Is it proper science when I don't know how to measure the thing it's meant to be a science of?